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Question 
What factors support or limit aid absorption? Are there any specific aid absorption tipping points, 
or contexts within which scale-ups in spending have been limited in effectiveness due to 
absorption issues? 
Contents 
1. Overview 
2. Introduction 
3. The aims of aid 
4. Recipient country contexts 
5. Factors affecting aid absorption 
6. Measuring the absorptive capacity of recipient countries 
7. Thresholds or tipping points 
8. Addressing absorption constraints and scaling up 
9. References 
 
  
2 
1. Overview  
Absorptive capacity refers to ‘the ability to use additional aid without pronounced inefficiency of 
public spending and without induced adverse effects’ (Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2007, 640). 
An absorptive capacity limit is the point at which a country can no longer absorb or spend aid 
efficiently and aid is then subject to diminishing returns (IES, 2017; Dornan and Pryke, 2017). 
Absorptive capacity involves not only the ability of a recipient country to absorb aid, but also the 
ability of donors to correctly assess and consider the recipient’s characteristics and absorptive 
constraints in designing programmes (Choi et al., 2013). 
Much of the aid allocation and aid absorption literature focuses on the effects of aid on growth, 
rather than private and public consumption and investment (Tengstam, 2017). This results in a 
large evidence gap, as findings in relation to aid and growth do not necessarily provide insights 
into the relationship between aid and other outcomes (Carter, 2014). Some of the literature 
emphasise that donors should not allocate aid solely based on growth targets and/or solely to 
countries with more efficient government and better institutions. Rather, aid could be used to 
raise the level of consumption of households in less efficiently governed countries that would 
otherwise experience prolonged poverty (Carter, 2014). Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) find 
that aid is generally absorbed, but that household consumption responds more strongly than 
investment or government consumption.   
Absorptive capacity and absorptive capacity limits varies across countries. General governmental 
instability is considered a constraint on absorptive capacity (Serie et al., 2009). Some studies, 
find however, that least developed countries (LDCs - with high vulnerability and low levels of 
human capital) experience increasing returns to aid and higher absorptive capacity, even if they 
obtain lower average rates of success  (Guillaumont and Wagner, 2014; Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006). 
Despite acknowledgement of the importance of absorptive capacity, empirical evidence on such 
constraints in developing countries is relatively limited (Presbitero, 2016). Constraints that are 
identified in the literature include: macroeconomic constraints; institutional and policy constraints; 
technical, human and physical capital constraints; donor aid delivery constraints; social and 
cultural constraints; and specific sector constraints 
Approaches to measuring absorptive capacity remain largely unsystematic and ad hoc (Lamb 
and Mixon, 2013). The Composite Index of Absorptive Capacity incorporates: capital constraints; 
governance constraints; and donor practices. The Measuring Absorptive Capacity framework, 
which identifies barriers to absorption by testing development, plans against local conditions. 
Some emphasise that absorptive capacity can only be understood in relation to a specific 
objectives or particular projects, rather than in relation to a given country or to aid in general 
(Choi et al., 2013).  
Attempts to quantify absorptive capacity constraints have focused on the concept of an 
absorptive capacity threshold, limit or tipping point – a point of negative marginal net returns to 
aid.  There are limited attempts, however, to develop a method of determining such a threshold, 
given that it would vary from country to country.  The empirical evidence that does exist is drawn 
mainly from aid-growth regressions, with 20% often being identified as the threshold beyond 
which additional aid is correlated with negative returns. Such studies do not take into 
consideration other goals of aid and forms of absorptive capacity such as absorption based on 
household consumption. 
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Absorptive capacity is not fixed, but can potentially be improved through successful reform and 
effective policies. However, there has been little systematic analysis on how to overcome 
absorptive capacity constraints (Lam and Mixon, 2013). Ways in which to improve absorptive 
capacity could include: alleviating macroeconomic constraints; simple, technical capacity 
development, particularly around bureaucratic aspects; substantive capacity development, such 
as improved ability to manage the domestic fiscal space; improvements in donor aid delivery; 
alternate channels for aid distribution; targeting different aid aims, such as consumption; and 
phased aid. 
2. Introduction 
The question of absorptive capacity has arisen in various international development contexts. In 
the case of Afghanistan, for example, some locals and international officials assert that 
stabilisation and development efforts would have been much more effective had there been less 
funding (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). In the case of the 2010 earthquake in Haiti, where already 
weak state institutions were further undermined by the natural disaster, there are also concerns 
that the country was overwhelmed with aid and able to effectively spend only a fraction of the 
amount received (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). 
What is absorptive capacity? 
Debates about absorptive capacity are often subject to similar uncertainties that characterize 
knowledge about aid effectiveness (Lamb and Dixon, 2013). While there are variations in the 
definition of absorptive capacity, it ‘refers loosely to the ability to use additional aid without 
pronounced inefficiency of public spending and without induced adverse effects, for 
instance the ‘Dutch Disease’, or the crowding out of domestic saving’ (Bourguignon and 
Sundberg, 2007, 640). ‘Dutch Disease’ refers to macroeconomic issues, whereby large aid 
inflows contribute to a loss of competitiveness through real currency appreciation (Guillaumont 
and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006, 4). While absorptive capacity can refer to disbursement 
constraints, evidenced through a long lag between commitments and disbursements, or low 
utilisation of credits, the more classical meaning is a decline in the marginal return of aid 
beyond a certain amount. This can be viewed at the macro level, in terms of growth, or at the 
micro level, in terms of projects or specific expenditures (Guillaumont and Guillaumont 
Jeanneney, 2006). In the case of growth, having high absorptive capacity means that economic 
growth is faster, the return on investment is higher, and foreign aid is better spent (Lamb and 
Mixon, 2013). Low absorption means that economic growth is stalled, investments are wasted 
and foreign aid is unproductive or even harmful (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). 
Absorptive capacity involves not only the ability of a recipient country to absorb aid in a way that 
achieves a given objective, but also the ability of donors to correctly assess the recipient’s 
characteristics and absorptive constraints and to design an effective project, given the context 
(Choi et al., 2013). Absorptive capacity can be low if donors have a poor understanding of what 
is actually possible in a local context, given local desire, resources, or capabilities, and how 
problems can be resolved (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). 
Absorptive capacity limits 
In contexts where total aid is relatively low, additional aid is likely to improve government 
performance. Eventually, however, incremental improvements can become negative (IES, 2017). 
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An absorptive capacity limit is the point at which a country can no longer absorb or spend 
aid efficiently and aid is then subject to diminishing returns (IES, 2017; Dornan and Pryke, 
2017). In such circumstances, allocating more financial aid to a government could have adverse 
effects, undermining government performance and increasing the risk of corruption and 
mismanagement. This could reach a potential tipping point where too much aid can impact the 
effectiveness of all existing aid (IES, 2017; Dornan and Pryke, 2017). There can be a positive 
relationship between the higher the level of aid and the faster the speed of aid increases on the 
one hand; and the triggering of negative net returns on the other. Speed of increase itself can 
add strain to an already troubled system (De Renzio, cited in Serie et al., 2009). 
Concerns over absorptive capacity have in some cases, justifiably resulted in some countries 
receiving less aid than they need (Serie et al., 2009). Donors need to be able to allocate aid in 
such a way that the performance of a recipient government is not compromised by having 
inappropriate levels of assistance (too much or too little), or too much of the wrong type of 
assistance (IES, 2017). 
3. The aims of aid 
Much of the aid allocation and aid absorption literature focuses on the effects of aid on 
growth, rather than private and public consumption and investment (Tengstam, 2017). This 
results in a large evidence gap. Findings in relation to aid and growth, in particular of diminishing 
returns of aid’s contribution to growth (a non-linear relationship) do not necessarily provide 
insights about the relationship between aid and other outcomes, such as increases in 
household consumption, poverty reduction and increases in welfare (Carter, 2014). This 
has implications for determinations about absorptive capacity and absorptive capacity limits. 
Research has often stated that countries with quality policies are better at absorbing large 
amounts of aid before the returns begin to diminish; and consequently that how much aid a 
country can receive depends on the quality of its policies (Serie et al., 2009). The neoclassical 
growth model, in particular, supports the idea that aid only causes growth in recipients with ‘good 
policies’, with the assumption that good policies are considered as those conducive to growth 
(Carter, 2014). 
In their absorptive capacity analysis Feeny and McGillvray (2009) find that while a number of 
fragile states can efﬁciently absorb more aid than they have received, a number receive far more 
aid than they can efﬁciently absorb from a per capita growth perspective.  They acknowledge, 
however, that this is not necessarily bad in terms of other aid objectives, including poverty 
reduction. 
Carter (2014) asserts that donors should not allocate aid based on growth targets (traditionally 
the criteria for performance based allocation rules) and solely to countries with more efficient 
government and better institutions that are able to invest aid more productively. These are 
countries that would often be considered to have high aid absorption capacity. Such countries 
would likely have a better future in the absence of aid and are thus less in need of aid. Rather, 
countries that are ‘stagnant’ are preferable recipients, as aid could be used to raise the level of 
consumption of households that would otherwise experience prolonged poverty (Carter, 2014). 
This is referred to as ‘Bauer’s paradox’ – where aid is most effective (in economic growth terms) 
where it is least needed, as such countries could grow on their own (Carter, 2014).  Further, it 
cannot be assumed that economic growth is the only channel through which to reduce extreme 
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poverty (Carter, 2016) and that the former should be the key consideration when thinking 
absorptive capacity and absorptive constraints. 
Domestic absorption typically comprises household consumption, gross investment and 
government consumption (Temple and Van de Sijpe, 2017). The ability to absorb aid could focus 
not only on translating aid into growth, but also absorbing aid in terms of higher consumption.  
Temple and Van de Sijpe (2017) find that aid is generally absorbed (it increases expenditure 
relative to output), but that household consumption responds more strongly than investment 
or government consumption.  This could be through government lowering taxes, rather that 
increasing government purchases; or through aid that bypasses domestic governments (Temple 
and Van de Sijpe, 2017). 
4. Recipient country contexts 
While studies have looked at increasing or decreasing returns to aid, generally, absorptive 
capacity and absorptive capacity limits of countries and economies varies, depending on 
their own characteristics, for example levels of education, capital and so on (Dornan and Pryke, 
2017; Guillaumont and Wagner, 2014; Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006).  Wagner 
(2014) finds that thresholds beyond which aid has diminishing returns vary according to structural 
characteristic. 
The administrative burden of receiving foreign aid is considered to be a key issue in fragile states 
(Feeny and McGillivray, 2009). General governmental instability is a concern for donors in 
terms of lowering absorptive capacity. In particular, it undermines personal and institutional 
memory amongst the recipient ministries, which means that donors have to start processes over 
again with each turnover; and undermines the average quality of personnel at any given time, as 
more highly qualified personnel are less tolerant of instability (Serie et al., 2009). 
At the same time, aid has the potential to enhance absorptive capacity in situations of 
structural vulnerability (instability), as measured by vulnerability indexes (i.e. the UN’s 
Economic Vulnerability Index or measures of export instability) (Guillaumont and Wagner, 2014). 
This is evidenced by a higher threshold of aid level to reach negative marginal returns when 
vulnerability is high, particularly economic vulnerability (Wagner, 2014). The stabilising effect of 
aid in helping vulnerable countries to cope with negative exogenous shocks is considered to 
increase the threshold of absorptive capacity (Wagner, 2014).  Vulnerable countries also appear 
less exposed to decreasing returns from World Bank projects as aid levels increased 
(Guillaumont and Laajaj, 2006; cited in Guillaumont and Wagner, 2014). 
In addition to vulnerability, low human capital or lower levels of education is another factor 
found to slow the decline of marginal returns with increases in aid (Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006).  This is consistent with the finding that the knowledge content 
that comes with aid has a higher marginal impact the lower the level of education. Thus, while 
vulnerability and lack of human capital are negative factors of the average success of projects, 
they are positive factors in making this success less subject to diminishing returns when the level 
of aid increases (Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006). Guillaumont and Guillaumont 
Jeanney (2006) conclude that least developed countries (LDCs - with high vulnerability and low 
levels of human capital) experience increasing returns to aid and higher absorptive capacity, 
even if they obtain lower average rates of success. 
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A recent trend in some low-income developing countries has been a rapid scaling-up of public 
investment, in particular infrastructure investment, sometimes in relation to the exploitation of 
natural resources of post-conflict and post-disaster reconstruction (Presbitero, 2016). While not 
necessarily linked to scaling-up of international aid. Presbitero (2016) finds that a rapid scaling-
up of public investment appears to produce absorptive capacity bottlenecks and poor project 
outcomes. Projects undertaken in periods of public investment scaling-up are found to be less 
likely to be successful, although the effect is relatively small, particularly in poor and capital 
scarce countries. The study also finds that project outcomes do not depend exclusively on the 
scaling-up of public investment, but also on institutional capacity: there is a positive association 
between strong policies and institutions and project outcomes (Presbitero, 2016).  
5. Factors affecting aid absorption 
Despite acknowledgement of the importance of absorptive capacity for determining returns to aid 
and public investment, empirical evidence on absorptive capacity constraints in developing 
countries is relatively limited (Presbitero, 2016). 
There are various types of bottlenecks or constraints identified in the literature that are believed 
to affect the capacity of recipient countries to absorb aid and limit the effectiveness of additional 
aid (see Bourguignon and Sundberg, 2006; and de Renzio, 2005 for categorisation). These 
include: 
Macroeconomic constraints 
The key macroeconomic constraint discussed in the literature is the risk that large increases in 
aid can produce inflation and an appreciation in the real exchange rate, undermining 
export competitiveness and, in turn, long term development (Dutch Disease effect) (Feeny 
and de Silva, 2012; Feeny and McGillivray, 2009; Serie et al., 2009; Guillaumont and 
Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006). This could explain why the aid-growth relationship is non-linear 
and exhibits diminishing returns (Feeny and McGillvray, 2009). Countries that are heavily reliant 
on exports would be particularly affected. Feeny and McGillvray (2009) state that in some fragile 
states, concerns about Dutch disease impacts may be higher than concerns over the capacity of 
the public sector.  
Findings in the literature about macroeconomic constraints, however, are ambiguous (Feeny and 
de Silva, 2012). In some circumstances, constraints other than exchange rate volatility will have 
a greater effect on export sector (ibid).  A recent study on domestic absorption did not find any 
symptoms of Dutch Disease (Temple and Van de Sijpe, 2017). 
Institutional and policy constraints 
Institutional and  policy  constraints  include  the  lack  of  capacity  to handle the 
administrative burden associated with high levels of aid (e.g. negotiation, management, 
long-term national development plans; reporting requirements) and to generate  credible 
strategies  to  transform  aid  into  development (Feeny and de Silva, 2012; Feeny and 
McGillivray, 2009; Serie et al., 2009). Strong institutions, capable of administering aid 
programmes and developing effective policies are essential (Feeny and de Silva, 2012). 
Presbitero (2016) finds that there is a positive association between strong policies and 
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institutions and project outcomes. The administrative burden of receiving foreign aid is believed 
to be a particularly problematic for fragile states (Feeny and de Silva, 2012). 
The response of recipient country’s fiscal policy to aid can be a key constraint. Adverse effects of 
increases in aid include an increase in undesirable expenditures; greater scope for corruption 
and financial mismanagement; and greater accountability to aid donors rather than to electorates 
(Feeny and de Silva, 2012). 
Technical, human and physical capital constraints 
Technical and human capital constraints include shortages in skilled or adequately trained 
civil servants to manage and administer aid flows.  Constraints can also occur at the sector 
level, with difficulty  for  developing  countries  to  recruit,  train,  and  hire qualified teachers, 
nurses, doctors managers, instructors, etc. (Feeny and de Silva, 2012; Serie et al., 2009). 
Donor aid delivery constraints 
Constraints generated by donor behaviour include aid fragmentation, with a multiplicity of aid 
sources in a country and/or interventions through small projects that creates a lack of 
coordination between the donors and the recipient country (Presbitero, 2016; Serie et al., 2009; 
Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006). This is particularly problematic in countries that 
are small, with low administrative capacities (Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006). As 
donors scale-up foreign aid, the burden can be further exacerbated by increasing donor 
proliferation and fragmentation (Presbitero, 2016; Feeny and de Silva, 2012). Serie et al. (2009) 
find that at times, problems in absorptive capacity in the ministry side have more to do 
with specific knowledge of donor procedures, rather than shortfalls in general knowledge of 
public management or education.   
Donor poaching of government staff can also undermine the quality of bureaucracy in recipient 
countries, resulting in absorptive capacity constraints (Presbitero, 2016; Serie et al., 2009). 
In addition, donors’ misunderstanding of a ministry’s actual capacity and the setting of 
excessive ambitions, rather than customized, realistic plans is another key constraint that 
undermines absorptive capacity (Lamb and Mixon, 2013; Serie et al., 2009). 
Social and cultural constraints 
Social and cultural factors can also constrain the effective use of additional aid ﬂows. These 
constraints relate to a lack of demand for health and education services in some developing 
countries. In such cases, even if schools and clinics are well built and staffed, people may not 
necessarily attend them. This needs to be considered when scaling up aid programmes in 
particular countries (Feeny and de Silva, 2012). 
Sector constraints 
Each sector will also have its own specific set of constraints that influence absorptive 
capacity. In the case of education for example, the following recipient-side factors influence the 
absorptive capacity of aid: the pre-existing educational attainment and health conditions of a 
population; per capital income levels; percentage of population under the age of 15; urban 
population and infrastructure; human and capital resources; and assessment tools (Choi et al., 
2013). 
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6. Measuring the absorptive capacity of recipient countries 
While debates over the dangers of ignoring absorptive capacity re-emerged with efforts to 
achieve the millennium development goals, and subsequently the sustainable development 
goals, approaches to measuring absorptive capacity remain largely unsystematic and ad 
hoc. There is no standard assessment tool (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). 
The most basic measure of absorptive capacity involves dividing how much donor money 
recipient countries have spent in a given year by how much money donors have offered. It 
is not clear, however, how this figure can guide policy beyond either offering less money the 
following year or attempting to build capacity to spend the money (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). 
Feeny and de Silva (2012) develop the Composite Index of Absorptive Capacity (CIAC), 
which incorporates three major components of absorptive capacity:  
• Capital constraints (including human capital and infrastructure constraints): proxies 
include the number of doctors, nurses and primary and secondary school teachers; adult 
literacy in relation to staff in recipient public sectors; extent of paved roads.  
• Governance constraints (including policy and institutional constraints): proxies include 
the World Bank’s governance indicators 
• Donor practices 
Lamb and Mixon (2013) introduce the Measuring Absorptive Capacity (MAC) framework, 
which identifies barriers to absorption by testing development plans against local 
conditions. It takes into account technical requirements, the political economy and adaptive 
capacity of recipient institutions and societies to absorb and make productive use of aid, and the 
delivery capacity of donor institutions. It involves the identification of the resources, capabilities, 
knowledge, or conditions required for the intervention to work but that are not provided or 
produced by the intervention itself (prerequisites). Input prerequisites for a police training 
programme could include, for example, the availability of qualified recruits and trainers; and 
decent pay for the police force, such that they have the incentive to take on more patrols. Once 
the prerequisite structure is known, it is necessary to determine whether the prerequisites are 
present in the system at the necessary level. This requires political economy analysis and likely 
field research (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). 
Its premise is that donor plans are easier to change than societies. As such, if a poor fit is 
discovered between a plan and the presence of prerequisites for its success, attention is first 
given to whether the plan itself can be revised to better reflect realities on the ground. This could 
involve addressing the missing prerequisites, for example including a literacy component to the 
donor intervention if potential recruits to the police force are illiterate. It could also involve 
reconsidering whether the objectives are appropriate to the recipient system or should be 
adjusted (Lamb and Mixon, 2013). 
In countries that exhibit low levels of absorptive capacity, donors should work to ensure that their 
programmes are effectively relieving existing constraints are at least working around them 
(Feeny and de Silva, 2012). 
Choi et al. (2013) emphasise that absorptive capacity can only be understood in relation to 
a specific objective, as each given objective will have a unique set of constraints that could 
undermine its achievement.  Further, determinations of absorptive capacity and factors that 
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shape or limit absorption often make sense only in regard to particular projects, rather than 
aid in general. What happens when scaling-up a cash transfer programme will be different from 
increasing budget support, for example (Expert comments). Constraints to reducing corruption, 
are also likely to be markedly different from constraints to providing access to piped water (Choi 
et al., 2013). It is thus not possible to establish a method for determining the overall absorptive 
capacity of a given country. In addition, it can be challenging to correctly assess recipients’ 
constraints. As such, donors must ensure their project design has enough flexibility to be 
reshaped in order to adapt to emerging constraints previously unaccounted for (Choi et al., 
2013).  
7. Thresholds or tipping points 
Beyond the question of what are the factors that constrain absorptive capacity, there is the 
question of what the consequences of exceeding absorptive capacity are (Lamb and Mixon, 
2013). Here, the literature often focuses on the subject of diminishing returns (whether they are 
returns to growth, returns to poverty reduction, or other returns) (Lamb and Mixon, 2013).  
Attempts to quantify absorptive capacity constraints in the context of aid allocation have 
focused on the concept of an absorptive capacity threshold, limit or tipping point – a point 
of negative marginal net returns to aid, a point that is reached when what the recipient country 
gets in return from increments in aid is less than an acceptable level or less than the increases in 
costs it generates (diminishing returns) (see Serie et al., 2009; Carter, 2014).  There are limited 
attempts, however, to suggest a quantitative benchmark or method of determining such a 
threshold, given that it would vary from country to country (Serie et al., 2009; Carter, 2014).  The 
empirical evidence that does exist is drawn mainly from aid-growth regressions, which focuses 
on the marginal impact of aid upon growth, In this case the threshold is the point at which the 
marginal impact of aid upon growth is zero (Carter, 2014). 
In discussing the CIAC index, Feeny and de Silva (2012) state that a way of examining whether 
countries are receiving appropriate levels of aid is to estimate the speciﬁc threshold at which 
diminishing returns sets in for each individual country. They assume that for a country with an 
average CIAC, this threshold is where aid accounts for 20% of a recipient’s GDP. This is justified 
on the basis that aid growth studies have identified this figure as the threshold for the average 
developing country. The threshold is then adjusted for individual countries by scaling it by a 
factor equal to its CIAC score relative to the average CIAC (Feeny and de Silva, 2012, p?).  
Feeny and McGillivray (2011, 59) estimate that the level of aid that maximises per capita income 
growth in recipient countries is when it accounts for 20.7% of a recipient’s GDP. Others have 
cited 30% of a recipient’s GDP as the threshold beyond which additional aid is correlated with 
slowing or negative per capita GDP growth (Lensink and White, 1999; cited in Lamb and Mixon, 
2013; Clemens et al., 2012; cited in Carter, 2016).   
De Renzio estimates a range of anywhere between 15 and 45% of GDP as the threshold, 
beyond which aid loses its effectiveness (cited in Serie et al, 2009, 6). Clemens et al. (2012) find 
a range of 15-25% of GDP (cited in Carter, 2014, 136). Carter (2015, 145) identifies average 
turning points across recipients at levels of aid intensity of 8, 16 and 24% of GDP. 
IES (2017) provides an illustration of absorptive capacity for a hypothetical recipient government, 
adopting the often-cited optimal aid level of 20% of GDP as the absorptive capacity threshold, 
beyond which government performance deteriorates significantly, to levels that theoretically 
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could be worse than if no aid was given at all. Absorptive capacity space is the difference 
between current aid levels and the absorptive capacity threshold, representing the additional aid 
a country can absorb without declines in government performance. 
 
 
Source: IES, 2017: 2 
An increased capacity to absorb aid can occur for various reasons (see following section). In this 
case, the curve in Figure 1 shifts upward and to the right, meaning that larger amounts of aid can 
be absorbed by the recipient government, without declines in government performance. 
Government performance is higher at all possible levels of aid (IES, 2017). 
There are various limitations to the estimates of absorptive capacity thresholds. Many of 
the studies use total aid flows, which often include humanitarian aid and emergency balance of 
payments support where aid is given in a crisis. In such contexts, large amounts of aid can 
appear to be associated with poor economic performance (Manuel and Hoy, 2015). Different 
types and forms of aid are likely to have different impacts with different thresholds with regard to 
economic growth (Feeny and McGillivray, 2011; Expert comments).  In addition, there should 
also be thresholds for sector or agency levels, being the point at which agencies should generally 
not receive more funding, in the form of projects (IES, 2017). 
Further, as noted, these estimates are primarily based on aid-growth studies, and thus do 
not take into consideration other goals of aid and forms of absorptive capacity such as 
absorption based on household consumption. Tengstam (2017) finds that there do not 
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appear to be any estimates of saturation points for consumption-aid as there are for growth-aid. 
In their absence, it has been considered reasonable to think that the amount of aid a country can 
handle may be similar between different aid purposes. 
8. Addressing absorption constraints and scaling up 
A recent study on scaling-up of aid by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
finds that drivers of successful scaling-up include: a proper vision; external champions (UNDP 
and donors championing its programmes), that over time transfer to domestic champions; and 
incentive mechanisms (Begovic et al., 2017).  
Enabling conditions for successful scaling-up include (Begovic et al., 2017): 
• Political space: considering political realities and gaining political support for 
programmes;  
• Policy space: addressing policy constraints that could undermine the implementation of 
programmes, such as actual decentralisation of national authority and resources to lower 
levels of government;  
• Institutional space: strengthening institutional capacities at local and higher levels of 
government, of communities and civil society organisations, such that they can support 
sustained scaling-up, particularly when donors withdraw; 
• Fiscal and financial space: ensuring that there is effective fiscal decentralisation in 
countries, such that they have sufficient resources and can deliver services to their 
citizens; 
• Partnership space: teaming up with various national and international partners is critical 
for effective scaling-up; 
• Social and cultural space: working to increase this space for programmes to grow 
effectively, focusing on including disadvantaged groups and with sensitivity to local 
community conditions and cultural factors. 
Absorptive capacity is not fixed. It can theoretically be improved by successful reform, the 
right policies and, potentially, by appropriate development assistance (IES, 2017; Dornan and 
Pryke, 2017). An increased capacity to absorb aid could materialise for various reasons, such as 
improved public financial management competencies or less onerous aid delivery methods, 
reducing the administrative burden on recipient countries (IES, 2017).  In general, however, there 
has been little systematic analysis on how to overcome absorptive capacity constraints (Lam and 
Mixon, 2013). 
Donors can respond to existing absorptive capacity constraints by adjusting its aid flows in light 
of such constraints. They can also attempt instead to relieve constraints and increase absorptive 
capacities in recipient countries through a variety of means (Carter, 2016; Feeny and McGillivray, 
2009). 
Alleviating macroeconomic constraints 
In order to mitigate the risk potential Dutch Disease impacts of aid, donors could aim to ensure 
that aid is directed towards the traded goods sector and to activities that are likely to yield 
productivity increases (Feeny and McGillivray, 2009). 
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Simple, technical capacity development 
Absorptive capacity could also rise with simple capacity building, particularly around 
bureaucratic aspects, such as providing specific training interventions for ministry and project 
implementation unit staff (Serie et al., 2009). Serie et al., (2009, 18) report that such capacity 
development has been used effectively in some cases to boost absorptive capacity by as much 
as 100% in 2-3 years. 
In order to address challenges with institutional memory in ministries, greater collaborative 
relations between donors and ministries could ‘give back’ some of this institutional memory. Such 
relations could even be institutionalized as part of donor coordination (Serie et al., 2009). 
Substantive capacity development 
More comprehensive capacity building may also be necessary. Improved capacity of 
government authorities to manage the domestic fiscal space, to develop effective fiscal 
policies and to execute budgetary plans, for example, can contribute to alleviating 
macroeconomic constraints and institutional and policy constraints (Terada-Hagiwara et al., 
2016; Manuel and Hoy, 2015; Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006).  
If recipient governments are effective in developing and implementing policies to improve export 
competitiveness, for example, through infrastructure development or even long-term investment 
in education, the value of additional aid flows are more likely to outweigh any additional costs. 
This has been the case with Liberia, which has attracted large amounts of foreign investment, 
without demonstrating absorptive capacity constraints (Manuel and Hoy, 2015). 
In the cases of Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, a  broader  focus  on  building  the  capacity  
of  the  civil  service,  improving  the coherence and coordination of the budget process, and 
ensuring adequate funding is provided for maintaining and operating assets is required into order 
to ensure that increased resources are absorbed effectively (Terada-Hagiwara et al., 2016). 
Specific capacity building efforts will be required for different sectors. In the case of 
education, for example, developing human capital, such as through training programmes for 
teachers and fair compensation schemes, can be a way to address absorption constraints (Choi 
et al., 2013). 
Improvements in donor aid delivery 
Donors can help to relieve the administrative burden of aid by improving the way they deliver 
their assistance, for example, by improving coordination of donor activities and reporting 
requirements (Feeny and McGillivray, 2009). Greater transparency in the criteria of aid 
allocation could also make aid more predictable, facilitating the domestic management of aid 
flows (Guillaumont and Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2006).  
The terms of aid could also be tailored better to the realities of the recipient country.  Carter 
(2016) discusses a two-stage procedure in the aid process, such that donors first decide the 
allocation of transfers across countries; and then determine the terms of the transfer, in 
collaboration with recipient countries.  For example, a very poor country could qualify for a large 
transfer, but this should not be accompanied by hard, burdensome terms. 
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In addition, as discussed elsewhere in this report (see Lamb and Mixon, 2013; Serie et al., 2009), 
donors should also set realistic targets and goals, based on the realities of the recipient countries 
– for example, using the MAC framework to ensure that the necessary prerequisites are met and 
altering plans if they are not. Choi et al. (2013) advocate that donors should develop an 
understanding of the history, culture and political systems of recipient countries to order to 
establish realistic and achievable targets. 
The importance of a ‘champion’ within donor agencies and implementing ministries is also cited 
as a key factor for successful aid absorption (Gualberti et al., 2013). 
Alternate channels for aid distribution 
In some contexts, such as in the case of some fragile states, channelling additional aid to the 
state may continue to run into absorption problems, despite efforts to support capacity 
development. It could be advisable to seek out alternative channels, that by-pass recipient 
country governments, for distributing aid (Feeny and McGillivray, 2009). Potential alternative 
channels include the public sector of the recipient; the for profit and not-for-profit sectors of the 
recipient; other forms of civil society; or donors operating in-country themselves (Feeny and 
McGillivray, 2009). 
Targeting different aid aims 
While donors target a range of development outcomes, the dominant criterion of aid 
effectiveness in the economics literature continue to be its effect on output growth (Carter, 2014). 
However, donors could have a greater impact and recipient countries could have better 
absorptive capacity by focusing on increasing consumption in slow-growing recipient countries, 
rather than accelerating growth in recipient countries that would grow in any case (Carter, 2014). 
Phased aid 
If recipient countries lack absorptive capacity, it may be advisable to increase aid over time, 
rather than to front-load it (Carter et al., 2015). Presbitero (2016) also finds that a gradual 
scaling-up is preferable in the presence of absorptive capacity constraints. This is based on the 
assumption that as recipient countries develop, they can use additional resources more 
effectively (Carter et al., 2015). 
Manuel and Hoy (2015) emphasise that aid naturally follows a phased process, as most aid 
agencies plan allocations years in advance. As such, recipient countries would have a number of 
years (e.g. 5 year cycles), in the medium term, to raise the capacity to use extra resources 
effectively. This could involve efforts, for example, to improve fiscal policymaking and/or to 
increase the export potential of the country to counter the possibility of Dutch Disease. In the 
case of particular sectors, for example the education and health sectors, it would be possible to 
build more classrooms, health clinics and training more teachers and health workers in the 
medium-term, in advance of the actual of disbursement of funds (Manuel and Hoy, 2015). 
Experience form Latin America demonstrates that such progress is possible within the time 
period (Manuel and Hoy, 2015). 
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